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288 
COMMENT 
 
Military Burn Pits in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
Considerations and Obstacles for Emerging 
Litigation 
KATE DONOVAN KURERA 
SUMMARY 
 This comment analyzes and discusses aspects of the 
ongoing KBR Burn Pit Litigation,1
 
 1. The litigation was renamed “In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litigation” by the 
Multidistrict Litigation Panel (“MDL”) upon request of plaintiffs. See J.P.M.L. 
Transfer Order, No. 2083 (Oct. 16, 2009). 
 an emerging toxic tort in the 
United States.  The litigation is in response to alleged toxic 
smoke exposures from burn pits operated by government 
contactors at military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
comment first discusses the alleged exposures and health 
concerns related to the inhalation of burn pit smoke.  Next, the 
comment explains the regulatory framework surrounding the use 
of burn pits abroad and the incorporation of this framework into 
military logistics contracts.  The comment next discusses the 
various legal challenges and obstacles Plaintiffs face in pursuing 
this not so garden-variety toxic tort case.  There are many legal 
defenses uniquely present that overshadow the typical toxic tort 
hurdles, such as causation, because Defendants are government 
contractors.  In the context of exploring the defenses, the type and 
scope of military contracts become relevant to establishing 
potential governmental contractor immunity because these are 
the contracts that Plaintiffs contend were breached with the 
negligent operation of burn pits.  The comment concludes by 
suggesting that the tests available for evaluating liability under 
military logistics contracts are inadequate, resulting in unclear 
standards for a reviewing court to apply to Burn Pit Litigation 
claims. 
1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Burn pits have been relied on heavily as a waste disposal 
method at military installations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 
the beginning of United States military presence in these 
countries in 2001 and 2003, respectively.2  Department of 
Defense (“DoD”) contracting companies, KBR, Inc., Kellogg, 
Brown & Root LLC, and Halliburton Co. (“KBR” or “Defendants”), 
through high-profit logistics defense contracts,3 provide the 
majority of contingency base operational services in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (e.g., potable drinking water and food services, waste 
disposal services, medical services, recreational facilities, and 
other services related to base operation and maintenance.)4  Until 
recently, little attention had been paid to the waste disposal 
methods utilized in the military war theaters in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  This dramatically changed when Joshua Eller, a 
computer technician deployed in Iraq, filed suit in 2008 against 
KBR for negligently exposing thousands of soldiers, former KBR 
employees, and civilians to unsafe conditions due to “faulty waste 
disposal systems.”5  Eller and a group of more than two hundred 
plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) returning from their tours of duty, 
attribute chronic illnesses, disease, and even death to exposure to 
thick black and green toxic burn pit smoke that descended into 
their living quarters and interfered with military operations.6
 
 2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), NO. GAO-11-63, AFGHANISTAN 
AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON OPEN PIT 
BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 8 (OCT. 2010). 
  
 3. Complaint ¶ 16, Eller v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 
2008) (alleging that KBR revenue from the logistics contracts for Iraq operations 
was 4.7 billion for 2006).  The profits KBR received from government contracts 
has been subject to much media attention. See David Rose, The People vs. the 
Profiteers, Vanity Fair, Nov. 2007. 
 4. Complaint ¶¶ 16-17, Eller v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 
26, 2008). 
 5. Complaint ¶ 1 Eller v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 
2008). 
 6. Complaint ¶¶ 22-23, Bittel v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-05041 (W.D. Mo. 
May 29, 2009); see also Complaint, Oches v. KBR, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-00237 
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 2009).  Plaintiffs, Staff Sgt. Steven Oches and Staff Sgt. Matt 
Bumpus, now deceased, were both stationed at Joint Base Balad in 2004 and 
regularly inhaled fumes from the burn pit.  In 2006, both service men developed 
a rare, aggressive form of leukemia, and both died in 2008 within less than a 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/7
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Plaintiffs assert that they witnessed batteries, plastics, biohazard 
materials, solvents, asbestos, chemical and medical wastes, items 
doused with diesel fuel, and even human remains being dumped 
into open burn pits.7  DoD officials say this waste stream 
contained items now prohibited pursuant to revised guidelines.8
The Burn Pit Litigation certainly raises larger issues 
concerning the import of environmental and safety standards 
utilized during wartime settings.  However it is the litigation that 
seeks to answer a more fundamental question of who should be 
held responsible for the alleged injuries.  While U.S. law 
expressly prohibits using burn pits for waste disposal,
  
Plaintiffs contend that KBR breached these contracts by 
negligently operating burn pits. 
9 the use of 
burn pits in Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the disparity in the 
application of environmental laws, regulations, and standards at 
overseas military contingency operational bases.  One paramedic 
in Iraq noted this contrast, stating, “there is no such thing as the 
EPA here,”10 while another soldier blogged, “[t]here is no way on 
Earth [the operation of burn pits] would ever be allowed back 
home . . . but hey, we’re not at home, so it must be OK, right?”11
 
month of each other.  Leo Shane III, Families, DOD Spar Over Dangers of Burn 
Pit Smoke, Stars and Stripes, Nov. 6, 2009, 
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=65885. 
 
 7. Complaint ¶ 12, Bittel v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-05041 (W.D. Mo. May 29, 
2009). 
 8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-11-63, HIGHLIGHTS, 
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON 
OPEN PIT BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCT. 2010). 
 9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) prohibits open dumping 
and open burning of solid waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 6945 (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-
7(a); 40 C.F.R. § 258.24(b). 
 10. Dina Fine Maron, Air Pollution: ‘There’s no such thing as the EPA here’, 
GREENWIRE (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/ 
2009/11/11/1. 
 11. Kelly Kennedy, Burn Pit at Balad Raises Health Concerns, ARMY TIMES 
(Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/10/military_burnpit_ 
102708w/. 
3
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II. ALLEDGED EXPOSURES AND HEALTH 
CONCERNS 
 The exposure to burn pits has generated complaints from 
service members since 2003,12 but the health impacts from 
exposure are largely unknown.13  While complaints identify 
exposure to burn pits throughout Iraq and Afghanistan (as of 
August 2010 there were an estimated two hundred and fifty one 
burns pits operating in Afghanistan and twenty two in Iraq,)14 
media attention has primarily focused on the burn pit operating 
at Joint Base Balad in Iraq, which was suspected of burning two 
hundred and forty tons of waste a day at peak operation.15  In a 
2006 memorandum, Air Force Lt. Col. Darrin Curtis, a former 
bioenvironmental flight commander at Joint Base Balad, 
identified the burn pit as an “acute health hazard for 
individuals,” and noted “it is amazing that the burn pit has been 
able to operate without restrictions over the past few years 
without significant engineering controls. . .”16  Curtis detailed the 
health hazards associated with inhalation of smoke from 
unsorted refuse and commented that the threats from open 
incineration of mixed wastes today pose more serious risks.17  Air 
Force Lt. Col. James Elliott co-signed the Curtis memorandum, 
adding, “the known carcinogens and respiratory sensitizer 
released into the atmosphere by the burn pit present both an 
acute and a chronic health hazard to our troops and the local 
population.”18
 
 12. U.S. ARMY CTR. FOR HEALTH PROMOTION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 
(USACHPPM), NO. 47-002-1208, JUST THE FACTS: BALAD BURN PIT (2008). 
  Even publications from the Air Force Institute for 
Operational Health state that open burning of refuse mixtures 
 13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-11-63, HIGHLIGHTS, 
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON 
OPEN PIT BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCT. 2010). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Kelly Kennedy, War-zone Burn Pits Violate Laws, GAO says, ARMY TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 2010, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/10/military-gao-says-burn-
pits-violate-laws-101410w/. 
 16. Memorandum from Darrin L. Curtis, Lt. Col., Dep’t of Air Force, to Dep’t 
of Air Force, 332d. Air Expeditionary Wing, Balad Air Base Iraq, 1-2 (Dec. 20, 
2006). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/7
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containing trash, medical wastes, and plastics can “yield a 
hazardous operation with potential impacts to human health and 
environment.”19
 According to the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion 
and Preventive Medicine (“USACHPPM”), sampling was 
conducted at Joint Base Balad at different times from 2003 
through 2007; however, it was not until 2007 that a formalized 
sampling protocol was employed.
 
20  USACHPPM’s sampling 
events indicated the presence of harmful pollutants such as 
“dioxins, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, [and] volatile organic 
compounds,” but all reportedly within acceptable ranges, based 
on Military Exposure Guidelines (“MEG”).21  USACHPPM 
maintains in its reports that exposure to the burn pit smoke does 
not pose long-term health effects.22  USACHPPM’s assessments 
were particularly concerned with testing for dioxins, which is the 
pollutant most commonly associated with Agent Orange used 
during the Vietnam War.23
 During a November 2009 Senate Democratic Policy 
Committee Hearing on military burn pits abroad, USACHPPM’s 
studies were called into question by Dr. Anthony Szema, Chief of 
the Allergy Section of Veterans Affairs Medical Center.
 
24  Dr. 
Szema, testified that the USACHPPM’s assessments were fatally 
flawed since they did not include data about particulate matter.25  
Dr. Szema noted that “the size of particulate matter is important 
to consider because the particles act as a carrier of various 
harmful chemicals in the air;. . .[t]he smaller the particulate 
matter, the deeper the particles are able to travel into the lungs,” 
posing a number of health risks.26
 
 19. AIR FORCE INST. FOR OPERATIONAL HEALTH, OPEN PIT BURNING GENERAL 
FACTS AND INFORMATION 2 (2004). 
  Dr. Szema testified that the 
health risks from exposure to particulate matter include not only 
 20. USACHPPM, supra note 12, at 1. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. AIR FORCE INST. FOR OPERATIONAL HEALTH, supra note 19, at 2. 
 24. Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick?: Hearing Before the S. 
Democratic Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (statement of Dr. Anthony 
Szema, Chief of the Allergy Section, Veterans Affairs Medical Center). 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. Id. 
5
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“risk of asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema,. . .but there is also 
an association with respiratory and cardiovascular mortality—
death—from inhalation of ultra fine particulate matter. . .”27  Dr. 
Szema warned that the toxicity of particulate matter depends on 
the compounds it is carrying, and therefore, it is necessary to 
always include in air quality analysis.28  Lt. Col. Curtis also 
criticized the sampling methodologies, claiming the wind patterns 
make accurate data collection nearly “impossible.”29
For months after the initial filing of the complaints, DoD did 
not officially comment on the situation, except to restate its 
position that “only minor, temporary effects have been identified 
with the burn pit smoke.”
 
30  DoD has since “acknowledge[d] that 
burn pit smoke causes acute health effects in some people,” but “it 
is less clear what other longer-term health effects may be 
associated with burn pit smoke inhalation.”31
III. REGULATION OF BURN PITS IN MILITARY 
WARTIME OPERATIONS 
 
 A complex web of international treaties, Status of Forces 
Agreements (“SOFAs”), U.S. domestic laws and regulations, and 
DoD instructions, directives, and technical manuals govern DoD 
actions overseas.  Although international treaties create 
standards for protocol at the highest level, the United States does 
not participate in many relevant treaties and often does not 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kelly Kennedy, Balad Burn Pit Harmed Troops Living 1 Mile Away, 
ARMY TIMES (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/01/ 
military_burn_pit_011810w/. 
 30. Leo Shane III, Families, DOD Spar Over Dangers of Burn Pit Smoke, 
STARS AND STRIPES, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.stripes.com/ 
article.asp?section=104&article=65885 (quoting Dr. R. Craig Postlewaite, Acting 
Dir., DoD Force Health Prot. and Readiness Programs). 
 31. Kelly Kennedy, DoD shows first signs of acknowledging burn-pit woes, 
Navy Times, Jan. 18, 2010 (quoting E-mail from Dr. R. Craig Postlewaite, 
Acting Dir., DoD Force Health Prot. and Readiness Programs, to Military Times 
(Dec. 21, 2009)), http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/01/military_burn_pit_ 
pentagon_011810w/.) 
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recognize international law at all.32  This practice complicates 
matters and creates ambiguity regarding applicable standards.33  
DoD regularly enters into SOFAs, which seek to establish a legal 
framework for applying foreign laws to U.S. military personnel 
operating in a foreign country.34  SOFAs, however, are generally 
only peacetime agreements that allow the U.S. military forces to 
operate within the host country and are rarely applied in wartime 
scenarios.35
 Additionally, there are few obligations for DoD to protect 
human health and the environment through U.S. environmental 
laws and regulations, since most U.S. environmental laws and 
regulations do not have extraterritorial application.  For example, 
while the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)
 
36 (a 
U.S. domestic law that regulates solid and hazardous waste 
disposal and open burning operations) does not have an express 
exterritorial provision, the extraterritorial applicability of RCRA 
has been the subject of some litigation.  Generally, parties have 
not been successful in overcoming the extraterritorial standard 
established in Foley Brothers v. Filardo.37  In Foley Brothers, the 
court held “unless a contrary intent appears” there maintains a 
strong presumption that domestic law applies within the 
territorial limits of the Unite States.38  Because RCRA’s language 
and legislative history do not suggest that Congress intended to 
allow exterritorial application of the citizen suit provision, courts 
have barred such application.39
 
 32. See e.g. Sharron J. Philo, Office of General Counsel, Defense Logistics 
Agency, Presentation at the Overseas Hazardous Waste Disposal and Readiness 
Workshop: Basics of the Basel Convention (July 13, 2000) (noting that the U.S. 
is signatory, but a non-party, to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal). 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 
(SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 1 (2009). 
 35. Id.; see also Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA], GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/ sofa.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2006). 
 37. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
 38. Id. at 285. 
 39. See Amlon Metals Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
7
07 DONOVANMACRO 1/5/2011  3:13 AM 
2010] MILITARY BURN PITS 295 
 
 The difficulty of applying U.S. environmental laws abroad 
results in DoD governing its actions abroad with its own policies, 
directives, instructions, and program and field manuals, which 
may or may not have legally binding effects.40  DoD Instruction 
4715.05, Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas 
Installations (“DODI 4715.05”), implements policy, assigns 
responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for establishing 
environmental compliance standards at DoD installations in 
foreign countries.41  The instruction directs DoD to establish 
Final Governing Standards (“FGS”) as the governing 
environmental criteria for overseas installations.42  FGS are a 
comprehensive set of country-specific substantive provisions, 
typically articulated as technical limitations on effluent 
discharges or emissions, or a specific management practice 
specified by the host nation.43  FGS are developed based on host 
country laws and requirements, as long as the applicable host-
nation’s environmental standards are at least as protective of 
human health and the environment as the standards outlined in 
the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document 
(“OEBGD”).44  The OEBGD, developed pursuant to DODI 
4715.05, creates baseline environmental standards applicable to 
DoD installations, facilities, and actions in the U.S. and 
incorporates the requirements of U.S. law that have 
extraterritorial application.45
 
 40. “Generally, whether a particular agency proceeding announces a rule or a 
general policy statement depends upon whether the agency action establishes a 
binding norm.  The key inquiry, therefore, is the extent to which the challenged 
policy leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion to follow or not to follow 
that general policy in an individual case, or on the other hand, whether the 
policy so fills out the statutory scheme that upon application one need only 
determine whether a given case is within the rule's criterion.  As long as the 
agency remains free to consider the individual facts in the various cases that 
arise, then the agency in question has not established a binding norm.” Nat’l 
Mining Ass'n v. Sec’y of Labor, 589 F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
  Since many U.S. environmental 
 41. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Instruction 4715.5, Management of Environmental 
Compliance at Overseas Installations ¶ 1.2 (1996) [hereinafter DoDI 4715.5]. 
 42. Id. ¶ 4.1. 
 43. Id. ¶ E2.1.1. 
 44. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, GUIDANCE 4715.05-G, OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL 
BASELINE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, ¶ C.1.1. (2007) [hereinafter DoD 4715.05-G]. 
 45. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/7
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laws do not have extraterritorial application, the OEBGD 
outlines minimum environmental standards and criteria based on 
domestic standards.  The OEBGD is used to develop FGS within 
a host county and, in and of itself, can serve as the governing 
document when host country environmental standards and 
requirements are not present or less stringent.46
 It is at the level of the OEBGD that basic guidance 
regarding the use of burn pits is provided.  The OEBGD calls for 
installations to develop and implement a solid waste 
management strategy focused on recycling and waste 
minimization, and states, “open burning will not be the regular 
method of solid waste disposal.”
 
47  Additionally, the OEBGD 
explicitly prohibits the use of open burning when installations 
operate a Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Unit.48  The Defense 
Material Disposition Manual (1997) further articulates that since 
installations overseas do not possess RCRA permits for hazardous 
waste storage and disposal, overseas installations must “comply 
with the OEBGD or DoD Executive Agent’s FGS for the 
particular host nation in which the installation is located.”49  
Similarly, Army guidelines on field waste management state that 
open burning can lead to significant environmental exposures to 
troops and “open burning. . .should only be used in emergency 
situations . . . [and] should be conducted as far downwind as 
possible . . . from troop locations and living areas.”50  The 
guidelines further explain that no hazardous wastes should be 
incinerated, since such burning can release toxic gases.51
 
 46. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Manual 4160.21-M, Defense Materiel Disposition 
Manual 10-1 (1997) [hereinafter DoD 4160.21-M]. 
  In 
2006, DoD further discouraged the use of burn pits by issuing a 
fragmentary order (“FRAGO”) incorporated into a document 
 47. DoD 4715.05-G, supra note 44, ¶ C7.3.13. 
 48. DoD 4715.05-G, supra note 44, ¶ C7.3.12.5. (providing limited exceptions 
to the prohibition of open burning for infrequent burning of agricultural wastes, 
silvicultural wastes, land-clearing debris, diseased trees, or debris from 
emergency clean-up operations.) 
 49. DoD 4160.21-M, supra note 46, § 10-1. 
 50. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TECHNICAL BULLETIN MED 593, GUIDELINES FOR 
FIELD WASTE MANAGEMENT, 7 (2006) [hereinafter TB MED 593]. 
 51. Id. 
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entitled the MNC-I Environmental Standard Operating 
Procedure 2006.52
 All of the abovementioned DoD documents provide minimal 
discussion and guidance on when and how burn pits should be 
utilized.  In fact, it was not until April 2009 (after the Burn Pit 
Litigation commenced) that DoD revised the FRAGO, which now 
offers specific guidance on waste disposal methods in contingency 
operations and explicitly states that open burning is prohibited 
unless otherwise authorized in writing.
 
53
In the mid-1980s, DoD made a policy decision to use civilian 
contractors to provide the military with logistical and operational 
services through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(“LOGCAP”).
  Implementation of 
these standards requires effective communication through the 
military chains of command and civilian contractors who provide 
the logistical support activities at installations abroad. 
54  LOGCAP contracts allow military units to focus 
on combat and mission related activities rather than expending 
military personnel and expertise on logistical and operational 
support services.55  In addition, LOGCAP contracts allow the 
military to identify needs and issue task orders to contractors as 
required by exigent circumstances.56  The majority of the military 
base operations in Iraq and Afghanistan utilize LOGCAP 
contracts.57
 LOGCAP III, first awarded in 2001 to KBR, is the contract 
that supports the burn pit services in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 
58
 
 52. GAO, supra note 2, at 10. 
  
KBR’s requirements and obligations are outlined in contract 
 53. GAO, supra note 2, at 11. 
 54. Def'’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 4, In re 
KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083-RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. 
Jan. 29, 2010). 
 55. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Civilian Contractors Engaged in 
Providing Security or Operational Support Services Under Contract to 
Department of Defense, Department of State, or Coalition Provisional Authority 
for Injuries to Their Employees, Members of Armed Forces, Foreign Nationals, 
and Their Survivors, 24 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 529 (2007); see also U.S. Dep’t of Army, 
Reg. 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 1 (1985) [hereinafter AR 
700-137]. 
 56. GAO, supra note 2, at 6. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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documents and the Statement of Work (“SOW”).  The LOGCAP 
SOW states, in relevant part, “the contractor will ensure the 
safety and health of personnel, equipment and supplies. . .”59 
while providing field services including “[f]ood [s]ervice, 
[m]ortuary [a]ffairs, [s]anitation to include [h]azardous [w]aste, 
[b]illeting, [f]acilities [m]anagement, [m]orale [w]elfare and 
[r]ecreation. . .”60  The SOW states that the contractor will 
“adhere to sound environmental practices and all applicable 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement laws and 
regulations”61 and implement a hazardous materials/waste 
services plan and an integrated safety and health program that 
comply with “Army Regulations, NATO Status of Forces 
Agreements, and federal, state and/or host country/region laws 
and statutes.”62  A former KBR logistics contract manager 
testified before Congress that KBR “management would brag that 
they could get away with doing anything they wanted because the 
Army could not function without them. . .KBR figured that even if 
they did get caught, they had already made more than enough 
money to pay any fines and still make a profit.”63
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR RECOVERY TO BURN 
PIT EXPOSURE 
 
 Plaintiffs have a number of legal hurdles ahead in order to 
successfully prevail in this litigation.  The claims Eller et al. have 
asserted include typical elements of toxic torts, such as issues of 
causation.  However, Defendants, government contractors, assert 
various liability shields based on the theory that government 
immunity should be extended to them.64
 
 59. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM 
SUPPORT CONTRACT, NO. DAAA09-02-D-0007, STATEMENT OF WORK § 2.5.1.3 
(2001) [hereinafter LOGCAP SOW]. 
  These immunity 
 60. Id. § 1.5.3. 
 61. Id. § 1.16.1. 
 62. Id. § 2.5.7. 
 63. Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick?: Hearing Before the S. 
Democratic Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Rick Lamberth, 
former KBR Employee). 
 64. Suzanne Yohannan, Defense Contractor Seeks Shield from Tort Suits 
Over Burn Pit Exposures, 18 DEF. ENVTL. ALERT, No. 4, Feb. 16. 2010. 
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defenses play a central role in KBR’s defense strategy because the 
operation of burn pits occurs in the context of wartime operations 
and is a military-authorized activity. 
A. Causation 
Although causation is typically a large hurdle for toxic tort 
cases, it may be a non-issue in this case due to the wartime 
setting, which provides Defendants alternative theories for 
seeking dismissal of the case.  However, for purposes of 
completeness, general issues of causation that could potentially 
bar the litigation are discussed. 
 In a plaintiff’s effort to “prove the causal connection 
between exposure and harm,” the plaintiff must show the 
following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) 
exposure to the substance(s) of concern; (2) general causation (the 
substance can cause the harm suffered); and (3) specific causation 
(the substance did cause the harm suffered).65
 In applying the causation analysis, Plaintiffs can prove the 
exposure to toxic smoke by first establishing, through direct 
testimony, that Plaintiffs inhaled burn pit smoke.  Plaintiffs 
allege that their sleeping quarters would often fill with noxious 
smoke, ground-level plumes would impair military operations, 
and Plaintiffs would have difficultly breathing on days the pits 
were in full operation.
  Meeting the 
burdens of proof for causation can be a significant obstacle in 
toxic tort cases and requires heavy reliance on scientific 
disciplines and experts. 
66  Next, scientific evidence demonstrates 
that the refuse stream of the burn pits (including tires, lithium 
batteries, Styrofoam, paints, solvents, asbestos insulation, items 
containing pesticides, polyvinyl chloride pipes, animal carcasses, 
and plastic water bottles)67
 
 65. Andrew R. Klein, Causation and Uncertainty: Making Connections in a 
Time of Change, 49 JURIMETICS J. 5, 25 (2008). 
 releases toxic constituents into the air 
such as dioxins, particulate matter, polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons, volatile, organic compounds, carbon monoxide, and 
 66. Complaint at ¶ 15, 16, 23, 24, Robbins v. KBR, Inc., No. 109-cv-00643. 
(W.D. Mich. July 14, 2009). 
 67. Id. at ¶ 14. 
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hexachlorobenzene.68  Moreover, DoD’s own sampling within the 
vicinity of the pit burns shows toxic constituents in the air from a 
number of sampling events conducted from 2004 through 2009.69  
This evidence provides the basis for Plaintiffs to show exposure to 
toxic substances released from the burn pits.  The general 
causation prong is not a significant hurdle in this case either.  It 
is well documented in scientific studies that exposure to the toxic 
constituents identified around the burn pits can cause the 
illnesses and injuries suffered.70
 In contrast to general causation, proving specific causation 
is a more complicated proposition, requiring Plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that “but for” Defendants’ acts, Plaintiffs would not 
have suffered the alleged harm.  The soldiers in Iraq work in 
harsh environments and are exposed to many elements 
throughout the course of their tours that could have negative 
health impacts.  Many of the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs, such 
as tightness in the chest, persistent cough, asthma and 
bronchitis, can result from exposure to frequent sand and dust 
storms and commonly impact soldiers stationed in the Middle 
East.
 
71  These facts cut against the preponderance of evidence 
threshold, under which Plaintiffs must prove that the burn pit 
smoke is more likely than not the cause of their injuries.72  In 
many toxic tort cases, medical science cannot provide conclusive 
evidence on the casual connection between actual injuries and the 
specific exposures.73
 
 68. Air Force Inst. for Operational Health, supra note 19.  In fact, the Air 
Force fact sheet states, “highly toxic dioxins, produced in small amounts in 
almost all burning processes, can be produced in elevated levels with increased 
combustion of plastic waste (such as discarded drinking water bottles).” Id. at 
19. 
  Another causal indeterminacy is the 
development of latent illnesses by the soldiers.  Latent illnesses 
can cause further causation problems since latency periods allow 
for more time for intervening events to occur that can further 
 69. USACHPPM, supra note 12. 
 70. See Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick? Before the S. Democratic 
Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 2 (Nov. 6, 2009) (statement of Dr. Anthony Szema, 
Chief of the Allergy Section, Veterans Affairs Medical Center). 
 71. GAO, supra note 2, at 7. 
 72. Klein, supra note 65, at 18. 
 73. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
383, 447 (2007). 
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weaken the causal relationship.74
B. Government / Military Contractor Defenses 
  Latent illness could be a factor 
in this litigation because many Plaintiffs were exposed as early as 
2004. 
 Another potential hurdle for Plaintiffs, in overcoming a 
dismissal of their claims (and likely addressed prior to issues of 
causation), is application of the government contractor defense 
and other theories of derivative sovereign immunity, which could 
immunize defendant KBR contractors for alleged negligent 
actions.  The framework for the government contractor defense is 
primarily based in the Supreme Court case Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp.75
1. FTCA and the Feres Doctrine 
  However, to understand the government 
contractor defense, one must examine the framework for the 
defense, as it is based in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 
and related case law. 
 The FTCA, passed in 1946, allows government employees 
to sue the government in situations where a private individual 
would be liable under state tort law.76  This is contrary to the 
historic principles of sovereign immunity traditionally enjoyed by 
the government.  Sovereign immunity, carried over from English 
common law, was premised on the notion that the King could do 
no harm, and should be immunized from lawsuits.77
 [I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused 
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
  As a limit to 
sovereign immunity, the FTCA provides that the government can 
be liable for: 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See generally Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 76. HENRY COHEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1 (2007). 
 77. 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3654 (3d ed. 1969). 
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 private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.78
However, the FTCA carves out a number of exceptions to the 
rule where the government can still remain protected under the 
traditional notions of sovereign immunity.
 
79  The relevant 
exceptions include the “discretionary function” exception80 and 
the “combatant activities” exception.81
 In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether or not the government was liable under the FTCA for 
injuries to servicemen arising out activities related to military 
service, since the FTCA contained no specific exception related to 
military service.
 
82  Feres consolidated three causes of action 
brought by military serviceman against the U.S. government for 
negligent acts of military personnel.83  The Court held that “the 
Government is not liable under the FTCA for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service.”84
 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
  The Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
known as the Feres Doctrine, essentially carved out another 
 79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (2006). 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (“Any claim based upon an act or omission of an 
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”). 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (“Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of 
the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”). 
 82. COHEN, supra note 76, at 4. 
 83. Plaintiff executrix of Feres brought an action to recover for the death of 
her husband, an active duty serviceman, who died in a fire in the quartering 
barracks.  Plaintiff claimed her husband’s death was a result of the military’s 
negligence in housing servicemen in quarters they knew or should have known 
to be unsafe. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 137 (1950).  Plaintiff 
Jefferson underwent an abdominal operation by Army doctors.  Eight months 
later, Jefferson had another unrelated operation during which the doctors 
removed a towel marked “Medical Department U.S. Army” from his abdomen. 
Id.  Plaintiff executrix of Griggs sued for negligent medical treatment by army 
surgeons.  The Court found the underlying common fact to be active duty 
servicemen sustaining injuries due to the alleged negligence of other military 
personal. Id. at 138. 
 84. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added). 
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exception to the FTCA.85  The Court’s decision was based 
primarily on the delicate relationship between military personnel 
and the Government, as well as the fact that federal law governs 
the relationship.86  The Court looked at the language of the FTCA 
that waives government immunity in cases where a private 
person would be liable under state law.  The Court found that: 
 [P]laintiffs can point to no liability of a “private individual” even 
remotely analogous to that which they are asserting against the 
United States.  We know of no American law which ever has 
permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his 
superior officers or the Government he is serving.  Nor is there 
any liability “under like circumstances,” for no private individual 
has power to conscript or mobilize a private army with such 
authorities over persons as the Government vests in echelons of 
 command.87
Feres is relevant in the government contractor immunity 
framework because this was the standard first reviewed by the 
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., where 
government contractors sought immunity from liability in the 
performance of certain military contracts.  The Supreme Court 
failed to extend the Feres doctrine to the military government 
contractors in Boyle
 
88 and instead developed its own test, which 
allowed liability protections to apply to government contactors.89
2. FTCA and the Discretionary Function Exception 
 
 As government contractor services became more pervasive 
in government operations, including LOGCAP contracts, courts 
faced the question of whether to apply similar governmental 
immunity to contractors who followed the specifications and 
direction of the government.  The FTCA explicitly excludes “any 
contractor with the United States” from its definition of Federal 
 
 85. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th 
Cir. 2007). 
 86. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44, 146. 
 87. Id. at 141-42. 
 88. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. 
 89. Id. at 512. 
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Agency,90 which plainly suggests that contractors are not eligible 
to utilize the FTCA liability exceptions.  This fact, however, did 
not preclude the Supreme Court in Boyle from holding that a 
government contractor could be provided the same liability 
protection as the government in certain circumstances.91  To 
establish the basis of the government contractor defense,92 the 
Supreme Court looked to the “discretionary function” exception of 
the FTCA,93 which “immunizes the United States for acts or 
omissions of its employees that involve policy decisions.”94
 In Boyle, a military copilot drowned when his helicopter 
crashed into the ocean and he could not escape due to the 
defective design of the escape hatch.
 
95  The plaintiff recovered in 
district court under state tort law, while the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, applying a military contractor defense.  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari where they articulated the rationale for 
the government contractor defense and annunciated a three-
prong test to determine its applicability.96
 In its simplest form, the government contractor defense 
provides a liability shield from state law product liability claims 
when a military contractor provides military equipment pursuit 
 
 
 90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006). 
 91. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. 
 92. The Court choose not to extend the Feres doctrine to include government 
contractors, finding that the Feres doctrine was both too board and too narrow to 
be applied to the government contractor context. Id. at 510.  The Court opined 
that the results are too board because immunity could be applied to contractors 
even when a helicopter was purchased from stock, and would be or if by chance, 
the “design of the stock item contained an injury-causing attribute which 
conflicted with state tort law.” Zitter, supra note 54, at 535.  Additionally, the 
Feres doctrine would be too narrow in that Feres applied only to injured military 
personnel. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. 
 93. Specifically the FTCA exception states “[a]ny claim based upon an act or 
omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the 
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be 
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 94. COHEN, supra note 76, at i. 
 95. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502. 
 96. See id. 
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to government contracts.97  Boyle holds that state tort liability 
should be displaced only where a “significant conflict exists 
between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the 
[operation] of state law.”98  The basis for the displacement of 
state tort law, according to the Court, is within the FTCA’s 
discretionary function exception.99  This exception protects 
governmental decision-making based on public policy 
considerations where the decisions made involve “an element of 
judgment or choice.”100  The exception does not apply when the 
government has no choice in applying a prescribed “federal 
statute, regulation, or policy.”101  The Court in Berkovitz stated, 
“if the employee’s conduct cannot appropriately be the product of 
judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for 
the discretionary function exception to protect.”102  This explains 
why the Court in Boyle held that “the selection of the appropriate 
design for military equipment to be used by [our] Armed Forces is 
assuredly a discretionary function” within the meaning of the 
FTCA.103  Government contractor liability under state law for 
military equipment design defects could create a “significant 
conflict” with federal policy.104  The Court found that declining to 
extend the immunity to military government contactors and 
“second guessing” the military’s procurement decisions would 
“produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA 
exemption.”105
 After the Court delivered its rationale for extending 
immunity to government contractors, it outlined a test to ensure 
the government contractor defense is applied in situations “where 
 
 
 97. Christopher R. Christensen & Anthony U. Battista, Brief: Framing the 
Government Contractor Defense, 38 Wtr Brief 12, 13 (2009). 
 98. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (internal quotations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 511. 
 100. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  The Supreme Court was concerned that holding government 
contractors liable would “directly affect the terms of Government contracts” and 
contractors would either refuse to manufacture based on the government 
specified design or would raise their contracting prices. Id. at 507; see also 
Christensen & Battista, supra note 97, at 13. 
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the policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated.”106
 Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be 
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States 
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the  equipment 
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the 
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that 
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
  
The test states that: 
107
 The test has been applied in many factual scenarios and 
has been subject to extensive litigation.  One of the main issues 
addressed by the circuit courts is how broadly Boyle should apply 
(e.g., outside military contexts, to other product liability causes of 
action, etc.).  The Boyle test has been discussed in cases of 
government contracts outside the military context, but courts 
generally defer to the derivative sovereign immunity analysis 
under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co. for non-military 
contracting situations.
 
108  The Supreme Court in Yearsley held 
government contractors are not liable when carrying out a 
“validly conferred” government contract under common law 
agency theory.109  However, in the military context, the Boyle test 
has been applied to a wider range of product liability causes of 
action, including failure to warn,110 manufacturing defects,111
 
 106. COHEN, supra note 76, at 28. 
 
 107. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
 108. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (discussing how the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity had its 
origin in Yearsley). 
 109. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); see also Carley 
v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding government 
contractor defense is available to nonmilitary contractors under federal common 
law); Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, 589 F.3d 196, 204 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying 
government contractor immunity under Yearsley). 
 110. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 629 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (applying Boyle to failure to warn claims). 
 111. The circuit courts are split on whether the defense can be applied to 
manufacturing defects. See Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 
1489 (5th Cir. 1989) (not extending government contractor defense to a 
manufacturing defect cause of action), compare with Snell v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the defense can 
apply to manufacturing defects). 
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and service and performance contracts (as opposed to 
procurement contracts).112
 The wide application and varying outcomes across the 
Federal circuit and district courts make it difficult to predict how 
the government contractor defense under Boyle can be applied to 
the KBR LOGCAP contracts.
 
113
 Boyle was a product liability (design defect) cause of action 
under a supply contract.  The applicability of the Boyle test to 
performance or logistics contacts is still largely unresolved, since 
a majority of the decisions addressing the issue have been at the 
district court level, with little guidance from the circuit courts.
  Looking at the cases that have 
broadly interpreted the Boyle test to include performance or 
service contracts provides a basis for understanding how the 
defense could be applied to the Burn Pit Litigation. 
114  
In Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters, the Eleventh Circuit applied the 
Boyle test to a helicopter maintenance contract finding that the 
specifications provided by the government were specific enough to 
protect the contractor.115  The court stated that even though 
Boyle referred to a procurement contract, the proper analysis “is 
not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding different 
classes of contracts.  Rather, the question is whether subjecting a 
contractor to liability under state tort law would create a 
significant conflict with a unique federal interest.”116
 
 112. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(applying Boyle to an Army maintenance contract); Richland-Lexington Airport 
v. Atlas Prop., 854 F. Supp. 400, 421-23 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding that the 
government-contractor defense applies to service contracts as well as 
procurement contracts, also held that the defense applies equally in nonmilitary 
as well as military settings); Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys. Inc., 835 F. 
Supp. 959, 966 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (finding that the government contractor defense 
could be applied to an action by neighboring landowners seeking recovery for 
contamination of environment against a contractor of an operations and 
maintenance contract). 
  In 
 113. See generally Sean Watts, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the 
Government Contractor Defense: An Analysis Based on the Current Circuit 
Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 687 (1999). 
 114. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Boyle, while discussing its prior 
decision in Yearsley, suggested that the distinction between the type of contract, 
procurement or performance, is not determinative. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506. 
 115. Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334. 
 116. Id. (citing Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641, 642 (11th 
Cir.1992)). 
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Hudgens, the court found that the direction provided by the 
maintenance protocols “involve[d] the exercise of the very same 
discretion” that would be provided in a procurement contract.117  
The court’s test for preemption, paralleling Boyle, states that as 
long as “prescribed maintenance procedures [are] reasonably 
precise . . . to ensure that a close relationship exists between the 
contract duty imposed by the federal government and the state 
law duty. . .the government contractor defense will preempt.”118 
 The application of the government contractor defense applied 
to the Burn Pit Litigation would be highly variable depending on 
the jurisdiction’s interpretation of the Boyle test.  However, if a 
court were to apply the analysis of Hudgens to the Burn Pit 
Litigation, the court could look to Hudgens’ modified test: did the 
United States approve “reasonably precise maintenance 
procedures” in the contract (Boyle speaks specifically of 
specifications, while Hudgens asks about maintenance 
procedures); did the contractor conform to those procedures; and 
was the United States warned about the dangers in relying on the 
procedures.119
 However, Boyle is still the only Supreme Court test for the 
government contractor defense under the FTCA.  If a court were 
to apply Boyle and/or Hudgens, a court would look to the extent 
the government was exercising its discretionary function in 
directing, approving, or controlling KBR in the waste disposal 
process, thereby causing a significant conflict with federal 
policy.
  However, Hudgens still poses a limitation to the 
Burn Pit Litigation, since the Hudgens court addressed the facts 
of a maintenance contract, arguably different to LOGCAP 
logistics contracts. 
120
 Since the litigation is currently unfolding, it is difficult to 
say how much control and the level of detail the military had over 
disposal of wastes during contingency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  KBR argues in its Motion to Dismiss, along with 
supporting affidavits, that there was a “pervasive ‘military 
footprint’ and control over the key discretionary policies and 
 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1335. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
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tactical decisions as to whether, where, when, and by what means 
waste would be managed and disposed.”121  However, review of 
publicly available contract documents, statements of work, DoD 
instructions, field manuals, and policy, indicates there was very 
little specific technical direction from the government.122  For 
example, the statement of work calls for broad declarations for 
KBR to maintain the health and safety of “personnel, equipment 
and supplies”123 and to “adhere to sound environmental practices 
and all applicable. . .laws and regulations.”124  Additionally, the 
field waste management technical manual only provides that 
open burning should not be a regular method of solid waste 
disposal and allows for interim means prior to the construction on 
incineration facilities.125
3. FTCA and Combatant Activities Exception 
  Application of the government 
contractor defense under Boyle to the Burn Pit Litigation is 
difficult to predict, given little precedent with LOGCAP contracts 
and unfolding facts. 
 As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Boyle found the 
government contactor defense was born out of the “discretionary 
function exception” of the FTCA.126  However, the FTCA provides 
other exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity.  One 
relevant exception is the “combatant activities exception,” which 
protects the government from tort claims “arising out of the 
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast 
Guard, during time of war.”127
 
 121. Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction at 8, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083-
RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010). 
  The extension of this exception to 
government contractors has been successfully applied in a few 
 122. See, e.g.,LOGCAP SOW, supra note 59, at 23. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 9. 
 125. TB MED 593, supra note 50, at 7. 
 126. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. 
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006). 
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instances arising out of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars; however, 
the Supreme Court has yet to address it.128
 District and circuit courts have addressed the issue with 
mixed results.
 
129  In Koohi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit 
extended immunity to government contractors through the 
FTCA’s “combatant activities exception.”130  Koohi involved a 
case of where an Iranian commercial airliner, taking off from a 
joint military-commercial airport, was mistaken for an Iranian 
fighter jet and shot down by U.S. military during a “tanker 
war.”131  The plaintiffs, heirs of deceased passengers, sued both 
the United States and private contractors for defective design of a 
military defense system used to shoot down the aircraft.132  The 
court extended the FTCA exception to government contractors 
under the rationale that “during wartime encounters no duty of 
reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed as 
a result of authorized military action.”133  The court then 
reasoned that since the commercial airline was flying in a combat 
zone and did not communicate its “civilian status,” no duty was 
owed by either the U.S. or its contractors who manufactured the 
defense system.134  District courts, however, have been reluctant 
to follow Koohi.135  For example, in Fisher v. Halliburton, the 
Southern District of Texas stated that the “extension of the 
government contractor defense beyond its current boundaries is 
unwarranted.”136
 
 128. See Zitter, supra note 55, § 7; see also McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 
Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1366 (11th Cir. 2007). 
  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in McHahon v. 
Presidential Airways declined to exercise its discretion on the 
 129. See Zitter, supra note 55, § 7. 
 130. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 131. Id. at 1330. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1337. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., Lessin v. Kellog Brown & Root, No. H-05-01853, 2006 WL 
3940556, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 12, 2006) (declining to extend the combatant 
activities exception under the FTCA to government contractors); Smith v. 
Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 1342823, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 
2006) (court was not “persuaded that the reasoning of Koohi” of extending the 
combatant activities exception under the FTCA to government contractors 
applied to the facts of the case). 
 136. Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
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theory of preemption of government contractor liability based on 
the “combatant activities exception.”137
 The D.C. Circuit most recently addressed the issue of 
whether to extend the “combatant activities exception” to 
government contractors in Saleh v. Titan Corp.
 
138  In Saleh, the 
D.C. Circuit reviewed the decision of the district court, which held 
that claims against government contractors involved in a service 
contract providing interrogation or interpretation services at 
Iraqi prisons were preempted under the FTCA “combatant 
activities exception.”139  The district court “fashioned a test of 
first impression” for contractors in the combat context, which 
would allow preemption when contract employees are “under the 
direct command and exclusive operational control of the military 
chain of command.”140  The action against defendant Titan was 
dismissed based on this test, and the plaintiff appealed; 
meanwhile, the co-defendant CACI’s motion to dismiss was 
denied, and defendant CACI appealed the denial.141
 In addressing the plaintiff and defendant appeals, the D.C. 
Circuit agreed the district court properly focused the issues
 
142 but 
provided a lengthy rationale on how extending liability protection 
to government contractors under the FTCA’s “combatant 
activities exception” squares with Boyle.143  The crux of the D.C. 
Circuit’s argument is that Boyle was premised on the “significant 
conflict between federal interests and state law,”144 and the court 
looked at the FTCA exceptions “to determine that the conflict was 
significant and to measure the boundaries of the conflict.”145  In 
Saleh, the D.C. Circuit applied the rationale developed in Boyle 
and found that the FTCA exception on combatant activities is the 
relevant exception that creates the significant conflict.146
 
 137. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1366 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
  The 
 138. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 23, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 139. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 4. 
 140. Id. (citing Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
 141. Id. at 4. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 5-8. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6. 
 146. Id. 
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court went on to say that the conflict arises because combatant 
activity is an area the federal government always occupies, 
creating a significant conflict with state tort law- an idea the 
court labels “battle-field preemption.”147  Just as the Boyle test 
was devised to ensure a government discretion function was at 
stake,148 the circuit court developed a test to outline the scope of 
conflict under the “combatant activities exception.”  Under the 
Saleh test, “during wartime, where a private service contractor is 
integrated into combatant activities, over which the military 
retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the 
contractor’s engagement in such activities shall be preempted.”149
 This test is clearly favorable to defense in the Burn Pit 
Litigation; however, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that “a 
service contractor might be supplying services in such a discrete 
manner – perhaps even in a battlefield context – that those 
services could be judged separate and apart from combat 
activities of the U.S. military.”
 
150  This recognition by the court 
could be an important factor in applying the Saleh test to the 
Burn Pit Litigation if it can be shown that, although in a battle 
field context, waste disposal services are performed in a “discrete 
manner” that can be judged separately from the military combat 
activities.  The court in Saleh compares this situation to Boyle 
where a government contractor contracted to supply a product, 
but was not subject to “reasonably precise specifications.”151
C. Political Question 
 
 The political question doctrine is based in the constitutional 
constraint of separation of powers.  The doctrine excludes from 
judicial review those controversies revolving around “policy 
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for 
resolution to the legislative and executive branch.”152
 
 147. Id. at 7. 
  In Baker v. 
Carr, the Supreme Court indentified six factors that indicate the 
 148. Id. at 8. 
 149. Id. at 9. 
 150. Id. at 9. 
 151. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9. 
 152. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 268 (2009). 
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presence of a nonjusticiable political question.153
 [1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.
  Under Baker, 
an issue is nonjusticiable on political question grounds if it 
displays: 
154
 Often, political question cases arise in the context of foreign 
relations or national security, and accordingly, the doctrine has 
been used in dismissing claims against the U.S. government and 
government contractors in times of war.  The military wartime 
cases are “an arena in which the political question doctrine has 
served one of its most important and traditional functions – 
precluding judicial review of decisions made by the Executive 
during wartime.”
 
155  As such, a number of cases against military 
contractors have been dismissed on political question grounds by 
the district courts.156  However, Baker notes, “not all questions 
‘touching foreign relations’ are nonjusticiable.”157
 
 153. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-18 (1962). 
  Many of the 
 154. Id. at 217. 
 155. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 558 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 156. See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644-45 (S.D. Tex. 
2006); Lane v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1971, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63948, at *15 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2006); Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 75574, at *6 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 11, 2006); Smith v. Halliburton Co., 
No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006); Carmichael v. 
Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2008); 
Whitaker v. Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 
2006). 
 157. Lane, 529 F.3d at 559 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
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district court decisions that hastily dismissed a plaintiff’s claims 
have been reversed or are pending appeal in the circuit courts.158
 Lane v. Halliburton and Carmichael v. KBR, two cases 
involving LOGCAP contracts during the Iraq war, came to 
different results with similar facts involving accidents during 
military convoys.  Both circuits suggested that the backdrop of 
the Iraq war posed serious concerns for “second-guessing the acts 
and decisions of the Army,”
 
159 which are normally “insulated 
from judicial review”160 under the political question doctrine.  In 
Lane v. Halliburton, the Fifth Circuit reserved three district court 
cases in a consolidated appeal, holding that the political question 
doctrine does not necessarily bar tort claims against government 
contractors performing support services under LOGCAP contracts 
even when “political questions. . .loom so large in the 
background.”161  The decision was based largely on the fact that 
the plaintiffs’ claims were for fraud and misrepresentation, and 
as such, the court felt there was no lack of judicially manageable 
standards to judge the negligence.162  Even though the factual 
setting was in the context of military activities, the claims could 
be resolved with “ordinary” fraud and misrepresentation 
standards without making an “impermissible review of wartime 
decision-making.”163
 KBR in the Burn Pit Litigation would likely rely on the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Carmichael v. KBR, affirming the 
grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
nonjusticiable political question grounds.
 
164
 
 158. See id. at 548 (consolidating and reversing district court cases Fisher v. 
Halliburton, Lane v. Halliburton, and Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, holding 
plaintiffs claims were not barred by the political question doctrine); McMahon v. 
Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming lower 
court’s decision declining to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action on political 
questions grounds). 
  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that the facts of the case would require 
 159. Lane, 529 F.3d at 567. 
 160. Carmichael v. Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1275, 
1280 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 161. Lane, 529 F.3d at 568. 
 162. Id. at 561. 
 163. Id. at 568. 
 164. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1275. 
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“reexamination of many sensitive judgments and decisions 
entrusted to the military in a time of war.”165  In Carmichael, the 
plaintiffs’ claims were based on negligent actions of the contractor 
during a military convey; however, the plaintiffs could not show 
that the military did not exercise complete control over the 
convoy.166  The defense’s evidence indicated that the military, not 
the contractor, was in control regarding all convey decisions, such 
as arranging, routing, and providing the security measures to be 
employed.167  In the Burn Pit Litigation, KBR asserts a similar 
evidentiary basis, attempting to show that KBR had no hand in 
the decision-making process for waste disposal.168
 Even if Plaintiffs can establish that KBR had much more 
control over the burn pits than is suggested in the Motion to 
Dismiss, the Baker factor of “judicially manageable standards” 
poses limitations.  In McMahon, the political question doctrine 
did not bar the plaintiff’s wrongful death action for soldiers that 
were killed during a plane crash operated by the defendants 
through a transportation services contract in Afghanistan.
  If KBR can 
establish their actions were solely based on military directives, 
policies, and judgments, it will be difficult for the court to review 
Plaintiffs’ claims without reviewing, reexamining, and “second-
guessing” critical and sensitive military policies decisions. 
169  
McMahon found that the defendants did not establish the 
presence of the Baker factors to warrant dismissal based on a 
political question.  In particular, although in a wartime context, it 
was asserted that the defendants negligently staffed, equipped, 
and operated the flight that crashed.170
 
 165. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1281. 
  The court found, “as in 
any tort suit involving a plane crash, the court will simply have to 
determine whether the choices Presidential made were negligent.  
 166. Id. at 1283. 
 167. Id. at 1277. 
 168. See Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 13-19, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-
MD-02083-RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010) (discussing the 
military’s role in burn pit waste disposal methods); see also Carmichael, 572 
F.3d at 1275. 
 169. McMahon v. Presidential Airways Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 170. Id. at 1363-64. 
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It is well within the competence of a federal court to apply 
negligence standards to a plane crash.”171  The court continued by 
acknowledging “that flying over Afghanistan during wartime is 
different from flying over Kansas on a sunny day,” but that fact 
did not make the “flexible standards of negligence” unmanageable 
for judicial review.172  On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit stated 
that courts dealing with situations involving military combat or 
training are not capable of “developing judicially manageable 
standards.”173
 In the case of KBR Burn Pit Litigation, Defendants argue 
there are no standards for a court to judge the actions of KBR 
employees when the U.S. military directed KBR.  KBR contends 
that the reasonable person standard is not applicable here 
because the case is not “a garden variety toxic tort suit.”
 
174  What 
is compelling and problematic for Plaintiffs is that, although 
waste disposal, via open burning, is strictly prohibited in the U.S. 
and presents a clear standard for cases on domestic soil, there is 
no standard available to judge reasonableness of care or duty 
when burn pit use in wartime scenarios is permitted by the 
military.  The Carmichael court comments, “in the typical 
negligence action, judges and juries are able to draw upon 
common sense and everyday experience” to determine if a 
defendant acted reasonably in a given situation.175
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Based upon a review of case law, there are many 
unresolved issues regarding how a reviewing court might address 
certain defenses in the KBR Burn Pit Litigation.  Which 
government contractor test will a court employ – the Supreme 
Court’s Boyle test, or the Saleh test?  Can the issues of waste 
disposal be separated out from governmental decision-making to 
 
 171. Id. at 1364. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction at 33, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083-
RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010). 
 175. Carmichael v. Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271,1289 (11th 
Cir. 2009). 
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escape dismissal based on political question?  Or could derivative 
sovereign immunity principles play a role in barring the claims? 
 What is clear, however, is none of the tests or standards 
discussed within this article are sufficient to address the liability 
of government contractors under military logistics and 
performance contracts in the wartime context.  The FTCA, the 
Feres doctrine, and the Boyle decision could not imagine the scope 
of military contracting taking over roles that once were 
exclusively conducted by military personnel.  The Boyle test is 
likely too narrow to address LOGCAP contracts dealing with 
waste disposal services, while Hudgens and Saleh have their own 
limitations.  Although Hudgens addressed a maintenance services 
contract, the government specifications for conduct under this 
contract were still fairly well defined, allowing the court to 
effectively modify the Boyle test.  Although the Boyle court 
suggested it should not matter what type of contract it is, the 
Boyle test is extremely difficult to apply because LOGCAP 
contracts by their nature lack the specificity of supply 
contracts.176
 The lack of a clear test for holding government military 
contracts liable under LOGCAP contracts poses significant issues 
for Plaintiffs in the Burn Pit Litigation.  Although Plaintiffs 
intend to litigate this suit as a “garden variety toxic tort” case,
  Application of Saleh presents limitations to the 
Burn Pit Litigation as well.  The Saleh test applies to combatant 
activities; although burn pit operation and use occurred during 
wartime in a combatant zone, the activity itself is not combative. 
177
 
 
the factual complexities will pose concern for a reviewing court in 
determining whether the negligence claims can be judged as such 
and not be influenced by the wartime context and setting. 
 
 176. See Justin Jacobs, The Boyle Test is an Insufficient Standard for 
Determining Whether to Allow Private Military Contractors to Assert the 
Government Contractor Defense, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1377, 1399 (2008); see also 
Rebecca Rafferty Veron, The Future of Competitive Sourcing, Battlefield 
Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 369, 381 (2004). 
 177. Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction at 33, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083-
RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010). 
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